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Introduction
This Symposium confronts the reality that genetic technologies – not just genetic tests, but
tools for altering plant, animal, and human genomes – are rapidly becoming and indeed already
are consumer technologies. People can experiment with and apply these technologies in
disintermediated formats, potentially without the involvement of national research funding
agencies, professional scientists, physicians, genetic counselors, regulators, and traditional
medical product manufacturers. The framework of 20th-century medical product and practice
regulations assigned each of these parties a role in promoting ethical, safe, and effective biomedical
research and health care.1 Do-it-yourself biotechnology (DIYbio), which includes direct-toconsumer (DTC) and do-it-yourself (DIY) genomic technologies, threatens to disrupt these roles.
This raises concerns about how to protect consumer safety, the safety of research participants, and
environmental and public safety to the extent these technologies are deployed in uncontained,
open-release applications.2
Some of these concerns relate to the mechanics of regulation – for example, how to stretch
existing regulatory principles and authorities to cover novel products and delivery pathways. Yet
these technologies also raise questions about the very goals of regulation, forcing us to reexamine
first principles such as, “What is the regulatory enterprise trying to accomplish?” This Article
touches on both these themes before concluding that some of the gaps in the current regulatory
framework for DIYbio are appropriate and ought to be preserved.
Focusing the Discussion
Before turning to those questions, it is useful to clarify how the terms “citizen science,”
“DIY genomics,” and “DIYbio” are used in this article. Discussions of how to regulate this
movement often assume that people participating in it are scientifically unsophisticated and require
close supervision as a result. An excellent article by Andrea Wiggins and John Wilbanks
acknowledges that citizen science comprises diverse activities that employ a range of scientific
methods and different modes of participant involvement.3 They define citizen science as “a range
of participatory models for involving non-professionals as collaborators in scientific research.”4
However, the available empirical evidence does not always support the narrative that citizen
See generally NAT’L ACADEMIES SCI., ENGINEERING, & MED., PREPARING FOR FUTURE PRODUCTS OF
BIOTECHNOLOGY 67–102 (2017) (ebook) [hereinafter NASEM REPORT] (summarizing the current U.S. regulatory
framework for biotechnology products).
2
Id. at 27–58 (describing trends, including DIYbio, that threaten to disrupt traditional biotechnology oversight
mechanisms).
3
Andrea Wiggins & John Wilbanks, The Rise of Citizen Science in Health and Biomedical Research, 19 AM. J.
BIOETHICS, n. 8, 2019, at 3.
4
Id. (emphasis added).
1
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scientists are non-professionals or scientifically naïve; many are scientists employed in academic,
corporate, or governmental laboratories who pursue DIYbio as an avocation, but one they are wellqualified to pursue.5
Professor Lisa Ikemoto explores various narratives of DIYbio.6 There are expressly
political narratives that sound in democratization of science, and nostalgic accounts that portray
DIYbio as returning science to non-commercial aims and an open-sharing ethos that allegedly was
lost after passage of the Bayh-Dole Amendments in the early 1980s.7 She draws on an 1893 paper
by Frederick Jackson Turner8 to suggest an intriguing alternative: DIYbio serves as a frontier of
institutional science, an outlet or safety valve that provides an “unconstrained space” to pursue
inquires that, although valid and potentially important, are not being pursued at the nation’s
traditional scientific institutions.9 The reasons might include, for example, ethical misgivings
about the research or the lack of traditional sources of research funding, such as National Institutes
of Health (NIH) grants.
Tinkering with the human genome involves risks that are poorly understood and difficult
to manage at this time. These include the risk of unintended off-target effects that might damage
regions of the genome that were not the focus of research, and a risk of unintentionally promoting
cancer while attempting to introduce a beneficial change.10 Traditional research ethics, and the
traditional research institutions that implement those ethics, might view these risks as ethically
justified under certain circumstances and for certain narrow research aims such as trying to develop
therapies for serious or deadly health conditions that lack good therapeutic options. The risks are
harder to justify for many other research aims, such as cosmetic enhancement. Many of these other
research aims do offer potential benefits; it would be highly beneficial to have a therapy that could
keep us all looking 25 years old forever. Unfortunately, many beneficial lines of research are
ethically problematic or fall outside the funding priorities of the traditional research enterprise.
Professor Ikemoto’s “frontier” theory portrays citizen science and DIYbio as a needed space for
scientists to pursue these beneficial aims.11
Doing so may require citizen scientists to internalize research risks by experimenting on
themselves. It might be argued that self-experimentation is, in fact, ethically superior to involving
hapless research participants in projects that are potentially beneficial but ethically questionable.12
At times, medical self-experimentation has spurred important advances in biomedicine. Allen
Weisse surveyed 465 instances of medical self-experimentation after 1800.13 He found that twelve
Nobel Prize winners between 1903 and 2005 engaged, at one time or another, in biomedical selfLisa C. Ikemoto, DIY Bio: Hacking Life in Biotech’s Backyard, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 539, 541, 546 (2017).
Id. at 548–52.
7
Id. at 550–51.
8
The Significance of the Frontier in American History, NAT’L HUMAN. CTR. (May 2005),
http://nationalhumanitiescenter.org/pds/gilded/empire/text1/turner.pdf. (quoting speech by Frederick Jackson Turner
to American Historical Association in Chicago July 12, 1893).
9
Ikemoto, supra note 5, at 552.
10
See, e.g., Erika Check, Second Cancer Case Halts Gene-Therapy Trials, 421 NATURE 305, 305 (2003) (reporting
that a gene-therapy trial to address severe combined immunodeficiency disease (SCID, or “bubble boy disease”) in
children had been halted after some of the participants developed leukemia, raising concerns that the research had
inadvertently damaged a tumor-suppressor gene).
11
Ikemoto, supra note 5, at 552.
12
Barbara J. Evans, Parsing the Line Between Professional and Citizen Science, 19 AM. J. BIOETHICS 15, 15 (2019).
13
Allen B. Weisse, Self-Experimentation and its Role in Medical Research, 39 TEX. HEART INST. J. 51, 51–54
(2012).
5
6
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experimentation and, in seven cases, the Nobel Prize was for the work that relied on selfexperimentation.14
While “legitimate” scientists generally favor other methodologies today, selfexperimentation was common in the United States until the mid-20th century.15 Small research
cohorts, including cohorts of one person, could shed light on important research questions of that
era, when infectious diseases, vaccines, and anesthesia were topics of great scientific concern.16 In
the research ethics of that day, some scientists considered it unethical to expose other people to
research risks, as opposed to taking the risks oneself.17
In the last half of the 20th century, the nation’s disease burden shifted and new research
methodologies, such as randomized, controlled clinical trials, emerged. These developments called
for ever-larger cohorts of research participants to answer contemporary research questions.
Research ethicists responded by enunciating modern standards, such as the Common Rule,18 that
conceive research as something scientists do to other people. The ethics of self-experimentation
ceased to command much attention. Yet in some respects, gene-editing research resembles the
early vaccine research of the 19th century as much as it resembles a late 20th century large-scale
clinical trial. Self-experimentation may, once again, be a useful research methodology in certain
contexts. A fresh look at ethical and regulatory principles, and how to promote compliance with
them, may be warranted.
This article accepts Professor Ikemoto’s view of DIYbio as a frontier for scientific
discovery but develops an additional point: DIYbio is also a frontier for business model innovation.
Christenson, Grossman, and Hwang, in their excellent study of disruptive innovation in health
care, remark that new technologies are, at most, enablers of transformative change that can make
a real difference in people’s lives.19 Advances in genomics will be necessary, but not sufficient, to
transform the quality of health care. There also must be business model innovation that profitably
delivers new technologies in ways that are affordable and accessible to consumers, and new value
networks, which are commercial infrastructure in which the various players “exert disruptive,
mutually reinforcing economic models.”20
Economic and regulatory factors create a significant risk that scientific advances in
genomics may fail to improve the lives of patients and consumers who might benefit. Today’s
legacy regulatory frameworks were designed for an industry structure and business models that
14

Id.
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 545 (citing SAUL BENISON, TOM RIVERS: REFLECTIONS ON A LIFE IN MEDICINE AND SCIENCE 54 M.I.T. Press
1967)).
18
45 C.F.R. pt. 46, subpt. A (2018).
19
CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSON ET AL., THE INNOVATOR’S PRESCRIPTION: A DISRUPTIVE SOLUTION FOR HEALTH
CARE (2017).
20
Id.
15
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prevailed in the latter half of the 20th century, the heyday of non-personalized blockbuster medical
products, for which high regulatory costs could be spread across large numbers of consumers.
These same regulatory processes, when applied to modern gene therapies for orphan or ultraorphan (extremely rare) conditions, deliver safe and effective therapies at eye-popping prices.21
Glybera, a gene therapy to treat a rare blood disorder, came to market in the EU at a cost of 1.1
million Euros for a course of treatment, only to be withdrawn after only one patient managed to
surmount the steep barriers to insurance reimbursement.22 Gene therapies promise to restore sight
to the blind but only if the blind, who experience above-average rates of poverty, unemployment,
and noninsurance,23 can self-pay as much as a million dollars per eye to see again. No matter how
great the science is, this is not a workable business model. Shaking up yesterday’s business models
may ultimately be the most useful contribution DIYbio and citizen science make.
This article explores the challenge of regulating of DIYbio and citizen science generally,
but then zooms in on genomic self-experimentation as a potential focus of regulatory concern. To
keep matters in perspective, DIYbio today mostly involves fairly basic activities such as testing
oneself to detect the presence or absence of specific genetic variants; extracting DNA; purifying
proteins; or genetically engineering bacteria, yeast, cells, or plants.24 Despite isolated reports of
people injecting themselves with gene-editing chemicals,25 there is currently no rush of people
trying to edit their own genomes.26 While not a focus of DIYbio activities today, such attempts are
foreseeable and do warrant some discussion, mainly to probe what the goals of regulation ought
to be.

21

Gregory Daniel et al., Advancing Gene Therapies and Curative Health Care Through Value-Based Payment
Reform, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Oct. 30, 2017), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20171027.83602/full/.
22
GRACE MARSDEN ET AL., INST. FOR CLINICAL & ECON. REV., GENE THERAPY: UNDERSTANDING THE SCIENCE,
ASSESSING THE EVIDENCE, AND PAYING FOR VALUE 19–20, 26 (2017).
23
See Blindness Statistics, NAT’L FED’N BLIND, https://www.nfb.org/resources/blindness-statistics (last visited Apr.
3, 2020) (citing statistics on the economic impact of blindness); see also Diana M. Zuckerman, NAT’L CTR. FOR
POL’Y RES. FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, BLIND ADULTS IN AMERICA: THEIR LIVES AND CHALLENGES (2004) (reporting
U.S. statistics).
24
DANIEL GRUSHKIN ET AL., SEVEN MYTHS AND REALITIES ABOUT DO-IT-YOURSELF BIOLOGY 11 (Woodrow
Wilson Int’l Ctr. for Scholars 2013).
25
Molly Campbell, Meet Josiah Zayner, The Biohacker Next Door, TECH. NETWORKS (June 21, 2019),
https://www.technologynetworks.com/genomics/articles/meet-josiah-zayner-the-biohacker-next-door-320964.
26
See GRUSHKIN ET AL., supra note 24, at 1.
27
See NASEM REPORT, supra note 1, at 69–70 (discussing the role of NIH guidelines in governance of both public
and privately funded genomic research).
28
Id.
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Twentieth-Century Regulation for the Twenty-First Century
The United States entered the 21st century with legacy regulations designed in the 20th
century. In those days, creation of nonmarket and public goods, such as upstream basic research
to discover new therapies, received public support through entities like the NIH which, through
the power of its immense purse strings, elicited compliance with important research, ethical, and
biosafety norms.27 These same norms were embraced by many commercial research organizations
that were not, legally speaking, obliged to follow them.28 In a competitive environment for research
funding, both public and private funders implemented rigorous review processes that deterred the
pursuit of “junk” science.
Medical product manufacturers, shielded by patents and high regulatory barriers to entry,
attained the scale and strong balance sheets that it takes to bear the costs of generating evidence to
support premarket regulatory review of their products.29 The large scale (and relatively small
number) of manufacturers made close regulatory scrutiny feasible and cost-effective.30 Healthcare
providers were generally convincing in the role of learned intermediaries. They incorporated
patient-specific data into decisions about how to treat real patients using products only shown safe
and effective for the average clinical trial participant, and they dispensed off-label prescriptions to
treat, or at least mollify, patients whose maladies had no approved remedies. All together, these
players delivered fairly good health care to many patients, with trial lawyers waiting in the wings
to pursue remedies if their efforts fell short of this goal. That was the orderly world of 20th-century
regulation—a world that is now being disrupted.
By 2015, the Obama Administration foresaw this problem and began efforts to update the
United States’ framework for regulating biotechnology. These efforts included a study of new
types of biotechnology products expected to become available over the next decade and the
adequacy of existing regulations to ensure consumer and patient safety and address environmental
and other hazards they might entail. The U.S. National Academies of Science, Engineering, and
Medicine (“NASEM” or the “National Academies”) performed that study and published it in
2017.31 The study presumed that, within the ten-year time horizon of the study, it would not be
possible to implement major regulatory reforms because of the time required to draft new
legislation, enact it, and put new regulations in place.32 This implied that the new products would
have to be regulated using the Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology

29

INST. MED., THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: PROMOTING AND PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC 197 (Alina
Baciu et al. eds., Nat’l Academies Press 2007).
30
See Kellen Zale, When Everything is Small: The Regulatory Challenge of Scale in Sharing Economy, 53 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 949, 964–66 (2016) (reviewing literature addressing the relationship between the scale of regulated
enterprises and the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of regulatory efforts).
31
NASEM REPORT, supra note 1, at 70–71.
32
Id. at 68.
33
Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23302 (June 26, 1986).
34
NASEM REPORT, supra note 1, at 70.
35
Id.
36
Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. at 23302.
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(Coordinated Framework), which is the scheme of federal oversight conceived in response to
advances in recombinant DNA technology back in the 1980s.33 Those advances raised concern
that there would be a large number of new recombinant DNA products for which existing
regulatory frameworks might prove inadequate.
Congress toyed with the idea of enacting special biotechnology legislation, but ultimately
did not do so.34 In 1984, a Working Group on Biotechnology working under the White House
Cabinet Council on Natural Resources and the Environment recommended that existing federal
agencies – such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) – should regulate new
biotechnology products using the statutory authorities they already had.35 In 1986, this approach
was formalized in the Coordinated Framework, which clarifies how the various agencies will share
responsibilities.36
The Coordinated Framework grants no new powers to the agencies. Each has only the
powers Congress already granted to it in its enabling statutes. Thus, the FDA uses the authorities
it has under the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA)37 and the Public Health Service
Act (“PHSA”); the EPA regulates under its existing statutes, such as the Toxic Substances Control
Act; and the USDA implements the Plant Protection Act, the Federal Meat Inspection Act, and
other statutes.38 The Coordinated Framework was updated in 1992 and at the end of the Obama
Administration in January 2017, although this latter update expressly declined to address
biotechnologies, like human genome editing, that FDA regulates as medical products.39 The FDA

37

Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75–717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C §§ 301–397 (1994 & Supp. II 1997)).
38
See OFFICE OF SCI. TECH. POL’Y, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, AN UPDATE TO THE COORDINATED
FRAMEWORK FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY PRODUCTS 9 (2017) (providing a list of key statutes).
39
Id.; Planned Introductions of Biotechnology Products Into the Environment, 57 Fed. Reg. 6753–62 (Feb. 27,
1992).
40
PETER HUTT ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1123 (W. Acad. Publ’g 4th ed. 2014).
41
NASEM REPORT, supra note 1, at 11.
42
Id. at 10.
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already had efforts underway, as of 2017, to set policies for those products, so the revised
Coordinated Framework deferred to the FDA.
The Coordinated Framework is criticized as a loose collection of antiquated statutes, none
of which was designed for the biotechnology products of today. To some degree, this is a fair
criticism. Today, the FDA is tasked with regulating the latest human gene-editing products using
drug authorities rooted in the 1938 FFDCA and the even older biologics authorities of the PHSA,
which harken back to the age when diphtheria antitoxin and smallpox vaccine were the latest
technologies.40 The National Academies, in their 2017 study, expressed concern that new products
might fall through gaps in regulatory jurisdiction and that the regulatory powers these old statutes
confer are not always what the agencies need to regulate effectively.41 For example, a power to
require brief, premarket studies does not answer long-term safety questions about gene-editing
products, which might require lifelong monitoring to assess whether they elevate patients’ cancer
risks. Another concern was that the sheer pace, volume, and complexity of current innovations
could threaten to overwhelm the agencies’ existing regulatory capacity.42
Despite these concerns, the Coordinated Framework has worked fairly well over the past
three decades. Congress used broad language when defining the products – for example, “drug,”
“biological product,” “device,” “food,” “pesticide,” “plant pest,” and “chemical” – that the FDA,
EPA, and USDA are authorized to regulate.43 The agencies have significant – although not
unlimited44 – discretion to determine what fits in these definitions. The FDA, in particular, has a
long history of construing novel products as fitting within its available jurisdictional categories,
and courts frequently defer to the agency’s determinations. A classic example is a 1969 case in
which the Supreme Court backed the FDA in deeming a product to be a drug, even though the
product undoubtedly would be a device under today’s standards, because the FDA’s determination
was “consistent with the FFDCA’s overriding purpose of protecting the public health.”45 There is
little doubt that many of the products used in DIY genomics and citizen science are of the sort that
the FDA and its sister agencies are authorized to regulate under the Coordinated Framework.

Strains in the Coordinated Framework
If the Coordinated Framework is currently under stress, this is not because of the
technologies and products that modern biotechnology is producing. There are a few notable gaps
in regulatory coverage, but the technologies and products are, for the most part, well within the
scope of what the Coordinated Framework was designed to regulate. Instead, the major strain

43

See id. at 209–12 (listing some of the statutory definitions).
Nat’l Nutritional Foods v. Matthews, 557 F.2d 325, 336 (2d Cir. 1977) (concluding that proposed FDA
regulations that treated vitamins A and D as drugs, instead of foods, were invalid as “arbitrary and capricious and
not in accordance with law.”).
45
United States v. Bacto-Unidisk, 374 U.S. 784, 798 (1969).
44
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relates to new business models for delivering biotechnology products and services. “The very
concept of ‘regulation,’ as developed and practiced under the web of old statutes the Coordinated
Framework rests on, fails unless there are suitable entities to regulate.”46 The Coordinated
Framework and its underlying statutes presume a 20th-century biotechnology industry structure
that has – and will continue to have – ongoing vitality. However, the traditional players
increasingly will be competing alongside new players with new business models, some of which
can evade regulation under current statutes.
Twentieth-century biotechnology regulations direct the regulator’s attention to “product
developers,” mainly conceived as “U.S. and international corporations, research organizations,
small- and medium-sized enterprises” that are involved in commercial development,
manufacturing, or distribution of biotechnology products.47 The regulator stands as an
intermediary between these commercial entities and “the public and society,” whose safety the
regulator is empowered to protect.48 Members of the public occasionally fall under these
regulations, for example, if Grandma launches a website offering her traditional home remedy for
commercial sale to the public as a cure for arthritis. In general, however, members of the public
play a passive role, simply consuming the products that corporate product developers design and
manufacture, usually with little public input or involvement. Individuals often engage in
“[u]nregulated domestic production and use”—for example, preparing a home remedy for
themselves instead of buying a manufactured drug—but regulators use their discretion and
generally avoid regulating these activities so long as they are small in scale and have personal,
non-commercial aims.49
The National Academies’ 2017 study noted several trends that are disrupting this
traditional regulatory landscape.50 An obvious example is DIYbio, carried out in community
laboratories or in people’s homes. Another is non-traditional funding sources for research,
including crowdsourced funding for biotech research and development projects. The result is that
important research activities now are occurring beyond the reach of the ethical and safety norms
traditionally tied to public research funding and corporate research policies that often embrace
those same norms.51 There are new commercial manufacturers operating in decentralized formats
or at a smaller scale than the larger product developers of the past. These smaller players
sometimes lack the well-staffed regulatory compliance departments with which regulators have
traditionally interfaced, and they may lack the large retained earnings that product developers
traditionally used to fund studies to develop the evidence on which regulators rely when approving
new products.52 “A key, new element associated with the development of biotechnology products
in the United States is the multiplicity of different players that intersect and collaborate in flexible
but robust entrepreneurial ecosystems.”53
These changes are spawning new business models: First, there are new business-tobusiness models. These include, for example, contractors that offer bioinformatics services to
46

BARBARA J. EVANS, PROGRAMMING OUR GENOMES, PROGRAMMING OURSELVES: THE MORAL AND REGULATORY
CHALLENGE OF REGULATING DO-IT-YOURSELF GENE EDITING, IN CONSUMING GENOMICS (I. Glenn Cohen et al.
eds., forthcoming 2021).
47
See NASEM REPORT, supra note 1, at 20 fig.1-1 (portraying this relationship).
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 27.
51
Id. at 85.
52
Id. at 33–35.
53
Id. at 36.
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existing product developers and laboratories, or laboratories that make DNA fragments and other
chemicals to order for other product developers.54 Second, there are new business-to-consumer
models.55 A good example is DTC genetic testing services. Third, there are new consumer-toconsumer models.56 These include individuals making products for commercial sale to other
members of the public. However, they also include individuals providing services, such as creating
a community laboratory that others can use to make their own products, or publishing instructions
to guide others in their own DIYbio activities. The fourth model blurs the roles of producer and
consumer, as when practitioners of DIYbio make products for their own enjoyment or
consumption.57
The end products of these new arrangements often are of a sort that the FDA and its sister
agencies traditionally have regulated. However, these new business models may cause some or
all of the production chain to evade regulatory oversight. For example, the FDA can regulate an
entity that manufactures or distributes a product and does so with the intent it be used to
diagnose, treat, or prevent a disease or health condition.58 A business-to-business laboratory that
synthesizes DNA fragments or chemicals is manufacturing a product and seemingly would be
subject to FDA regulation, because the FDA’s definition of a “drug” includes “a component” of
a finished drug product.59 In contrast, a business-to-business provider of bioinformatics analysis
is supplying a service, rather than a product, and seemingly escapes FDA’s jurisdiction. Even if
the software helps a drug manufacturer screen the safety of its finished drug, the software is not
itself a drug component. The FDA can regulate software as a medical device (SAMD), standalone software that is intended to diagnose, treat, or prevent disease.60 However, the
bioinformatics software in this example is not itself intended for use in treating patients; it is
intended for use in designing a drug, and the drug is the product that will treat the patient. This
software, therefore, does not appear to qualify as SAMD.
The new business-to-consumer models present similar issues. The FDA has already
asserted jurisdiction over several DTC test providers, such as 23andMe, whose advertising or test
reports suggested they intended for their tests to be used in diagnosing, treating, or preventing
disease.61 Other DTC providers, however, offer data-only services that simply report which genetic
variants the person has, without making any claims or interpretive statements about how those
variants might affect the person’s health. FDA officials have indicated in the past that they do not
view data-only tests as medical devices that the agency can regulate.62 Consumers can then enter
their data-only results into various online software tools or submit them to stand-alone genetic
interpretation services that help consumers understand how their variants might affect their health.
It is not clear that the FDA can regulate those tools and services, because the providers are

54

Id. at 37.
Id.
56
Id. at 37.
57
Id. at 36.
58
See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1), (h) (2018)..
59
Id. § 321g(1)(4).
60
See INT’L MED. DEVICE REGULATOR’S F., SOFTWARE AS A MEDICAL DEVICE (SAMD): KEY DEFINITIONS 6 (2013)
(defining software as a medical device).
61
21 U.S.C. § 321(h).
62
Dan Vorhaus et al., DTC Testing and the FDA: Is There an End in Sight to the Regulatory Uncertainty?,
GENOMES UNZIPPED (June 16, 2011), http://genomesunzipped.org/2011/06/dtc-genetic-testing-and-the-fda-is-therean-end-in-sight-to-the-regulatory-uncertainty.php#more-3681.
55
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distributing informational or professional services, without manufacturing or performing any
tests.63
Consumer-to-consumer business models present similar ambiguities. An individual who
uses DIYbio to synthesize a product for others is a manufacturer, as far as the FDA is concerned,
and that is true whether the product is sold or distributed gratis. If the individual intends for the
product to be used as a dietary supplement, food additive, or medical food (e.g., a genetically
enhanced yogurt culture) or as a cosmetic or drug (e.g., an anti-aging potion), the FDA can regulate
it, assuming the agency finds out the product exists.64 The DIY practitioner could, however, evade
FDA jurisdiction if it refrained from manufacturing the product and instead published instructions
on how to make the product or established a community laboratory that customers can use, for a
fee, to make their own supplies. These latter activities are in the nature of services, and writing
“how-to” books often enjoys First Amendment protection. DIYbio products can be delivered in
various ways that may, or may not, be subject to regulation.
The fourth business model – producing biotechnology products for one’s own use –
presents special regulatory issues discussed later in this article. DIYbio projects are extremely
diverse. Many are unrelated to health and raise few, if any, regulatory concerns. Good examples
are projects to develop genetic tests to identify which neighborhood dog is defiling one’s yard, or
to detect whether restaurants are correctly advertising the species of fish in their sushi.65 In
contrast, other DIYbio efforts – such as a diabetic’s attempt to make low-cost insulin, or a
gardener’s attempt to engineer plants for open release into the environment – do raise important
questions about the capacity of Coordinated Framework agencies to provide adequate oversight.66
The new business models create challenges that the National Academies described in their
2017 study: Today’s biotechnology platforms – that is, products used to make other biotechnology
products – have altered the relationship between “wet-lab” and “dry-lab” functions within the
product supply chain.67 Wet-lab products are physical things like DNA/RNA, cells, enzymes,
vectors, and sequencing prep kits, whereas dry-lab products are things like computer-aided design
software or bioinformatics tools which, when offered on a stand-alone basis, are in the nature of
services.68 The new platforms make it possible to redesign the workflows required to make new
biotechnology products. The result is new business models, some of which may fall outside the
jurisdiction of traditional safety and environmental regulators like the FDA, EPA, and USDA. The
entity that manufactures a new product may be different from the entity that forms the intent for
how it will be used. This can leave gaps in regulatory coverage, even when the finished product is
of a sort that the public expects is receiving governmental oversight. Even when regulators do have
jurisdiction, the presence of new and unconventional players creates novel challenges. For
example, agencies trying to monitor DIYbio to address bioterrorism risks have embraced a lighthanded approach because of concerns that aggressive regulatory enforcement might drive these
activities underground, making oversight even more difficult than it already is.69
The Practical Challenge of Regulating Small, DIY Producers
63

Gail H. Javitt & Katherine Strong Carner, Regulation of Next Generation Sequencing, 42 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 9,
9–21 (2014).
64
21 U.S.C. §§ 321(ff), 321(s), 360ee(b)(3), 321(i), 321(g)(1).
65
Ikemoto, supra note 5, at 543.
66
Id.; see also NASEM REPORT, supra note 1, at 46–47.
67
NASEM REPORT, supra note 1, at 5.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 73.
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Individuals, working at home or in community laboratories, now are able to manufacture
products that once would have required a large organization to assemble. Individuals have access
to sophisticated software tools to help them design strands of DNA to perform particular functions,
such as enabling a cell to detect a specific chemical stimulus and react to it. 70 Using these tools,
individuals can design strands of DNA or guide RNAs for CRISPR editing systems that can make
cells have new characteristics.71 Standard biological parts, such as off-the-shelf DNA strands to
perform particular functions, are available for purchase, and contract laboratories can synthesize
customized DNA and RNA in response to a customer’s order.72 Even individuals with “no special
knowledge of genetic engineering” can manipulate plant and animal genomes.73
The providers of goods and services with which the individual does business may or may
not be subject to oversight by Coordinated Framework agencies like the FDA. A vendor whose
software can design DNA molecules is not involved in manufacturing any physical product, and
may not form any particular intent with respect to how the molecules will be used. The contract
laboratory that manufactures DNA sequences and other molecules may be unaware of their
ultimate intended use. Many of these products lend themselves to a wide variety of uses, so that it
is not possible to infer an intent for clinical use from the mere fact that an order was placed and
filled. The product might end up in a hobby project to modify an orchid plant, or in a preclinical
research use, or in an attempt to modify a human genome for therapeutic purposes. The Federal
Select Agent Program administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the Centers for
Disease Control recognizes a small number (roughly 65) of biological agents that have narrow
uses and a high potential for harm, such that any shipment of these chemicals triggers regulatory
oversight.74 Outside this small set of biological agents, which include things like the Ebola virus,
most of the things laboratories ship cannot be presumed to have any particular intended use. FDA
seemingly has no basis to infer that the contract laboratory intended for its creation to be used as
a medical product.
This leaves the individual DIYbio practitioner as a potential target for regulation, but
regulating these small players poses a number of logistical and practical challenges, even when an
agency like the FDA theoretically has jurisdiction to do so. Similar challenges occur in regulating
participants in the sharing economy, which includes people who drive for ride-hailing services like
Uber and Lyft or who rent their homes through platforms like Airbnb.75 “[S]cale is a defining
feature and fundamental challenge of the sharing economy.”76 The nation’s legacy regulatory
frameworks are designed to regulate a discrete number of large, commercial product developers.
The sharing economy includes three-way transactions among a massive number of small providers,
consumers, and platforms that bring them together.
The sharing economy is large in the aggregate, with it estimated that about half of
Americans participate either as producers or consumers, but missing are the large providers of
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goods and services that were the focus of 20th century regulatory schemes.77 Zale points out that
20th century regulators could order hotels to implement consumer safety measures and to
accommodate disabled guests; the hotels were at known locations that regulators could easily
inspect, and the hotels had sufficient revenue to absorb the regulatory compliance costs. The same
is not true as hotels are replaced by millions of individual homeowners renting a room through
home-sharing services like Airbnb; “when everything is small, the regulatory challenge is
immense.”78 In some cases, 20th century regulations expressly exclude small actors from
regulation, as seen in some labor laws and workplace safety regulations.79 Even when regulations
do not expressly provide breaks for small suppliers, regulators have often used their discretion to
avoid regulating them.
Zale explores traditional and emerging rationales for non-regulation of small players.80 One
is the de minimis nature of individual, small-scale activities, which may have only a minor link to
interstate commerce. It is thought harsh to place the heavy burdens and costs of regulatory
compliance on small players, and there are concerns about the feasibility and costs of having
regulatory agencies scale up to oversee activities at thousands or millions of diffuse sites around
the nation. Regulating individuals triggers concerns about personal privacy, and regulators could
face constitutional barriers to invading people’s homes. An emerging issue is that the information
regulators need to detect and regulate individual players may be held by third parties, such as the
platforms that broker individual transactions in the sharing economy. Regulators might lack
jurisdiction to force the platforms to disclose information, if the platforms are not themselves
involved in the activities (such as providing lodging or ride services) that trigger regulatory
jurisdiction. Moreover, the platforms sometimes are subject to state privacy laws or business
policies that force them to protect individuals’ privacy. Finally, there is wide skepticism that
coercive, top-down regulation would be effective. Social norms or other community-based
mechanisms might offer better ways to promote good conduct at the level of individuals.
There do not appear to be express statutory limits on the FDA’s ability to regulate
individual DIYbio practitioners that become producers of medical products. The FDA’s statutes
do not vary regulatory requirements based on the size of the manufacturer, although there is some
easing of requirements based on the market size of the product. Thus, the FDA’s device statute
eases regulatory burdens for custom devices, such as orthotic devices to help with foot pain and
orthodontic appliances, which are customized for each patient.81 Custom devices are sold in
quantities of five or fewer devices per year, although the companies that make them often are
large-scale operations serving large numbers of customers. Drugs and biological products designed
to treat rare diseases can obtain orphan drug designation, but the scale involved is still quite a large
market serving up to 200,000 patients per year.82 The companies serving these niche markets may
be large pharmaceutical companies in their own right, for which the orphan drug is only one of
many product offerings.
The FDA’s traditional non-regulation of individual producers reflects an exercise of
enforcement discretion, rather than a jurisdictional limitation. A mother who makes chicken soup
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for her family or friends with claims that it will cure their colds is, technically, a drug manufacturer.
Mom intends for the soup to be used for “the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention
of” disease.83 So long as Mom’s soup distribution remains personal and non-commercial, the FDA
generally looks the other way. If, however, mom scales up her operations and starts marketing
soup commercially with curative claims, the agency could change course and send mom a warning
letter.
Zale maintains that twentieth-century regulations functioned well precisely because FDA
and other regulators recognized a distinction between commercial and large-scale activities that
warranted regulation, and personal or small-scale activities that deserved leniency.84 DIYbio is
eroding these crucial distinctions. “Small-scale activities that once fit criteria for light or no
regulation” can attain aggregate volumes that threaten to marginalize consumer-safety regulators,
if they continue to focus only on traditional, large-scale players.85
There have been many calls for safety regulators to step up their oversight of DIY
genomics, yet the Coordinated Framework leaves them ill-equipped for the task. The contract
laboratories and informatics service providers that enable individual production may themselves
escape FDA oversight. The FDA technically has jurisdiction to regulate individual DIYbio
producers that position their offerings as medical products. Yet the agency’s available regulatory
tools, such as inspections, can be constitutionally cumbersome when the inspected facility is a
person’s home. Traditional product developers, by obtaining FDA clearance or approval to market
a product, effectively consent to inspection of their facilities; refusing to admit an FDA inspector
is a prohibited act that can cause the product to become adulterated or misbranded.86 Yet if FDA
inspectors show up at my home, they had better show me a warrant. 87 This, of course, presumes
the FDA finds out I am cooking up genetically modified things in my kitchen. What if individual
DIYbio producers forget to comply with the FDA’s registration and listing regulations? 88 Those
regulations require medical product manufacturers to make themselves known to the FDA so that
the agency will know where to inspect. The agency staffing and budgets necessary to enforce FDA
regulations against large numbers of individual DIYbio producers could make regulatory
enforcement infeasible, if DIYbio catches on and large numbers of Americans start to do it.
Moral Problems in Regulating the Individual Producer/Consumer
The practical regulatory challenges just described apply to individual DIYbio producers,
whether they are making products for others under a consumer-to-consumer business model or
developing products for their own enjoyment and use. This latter scenario, in which the individual
doubles as producer and consumer, poses an additional complexity concerning the goals of
consumer safety regulations. If an adult wishes to edit her genome to alter her body in ways that
many people would regard as harmful, is it really the FDA’s role to stop her? By analogy, the FDA
has no jurisdiction to stop people from covering their bodies with tattoos, although FDA is
authorized to regulate the needles and ink to ensure they are sanitary and non-toxic. Congress
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authorizes the FDA to regulate producers and distributors of medical products, but not to regulate
consumers. DIYbio interjects a new self-service business model in which the individual is both
producer and consumer. This creates a risk that the FDA’s role in regulating producers might blur
into inappropriate regulation of consumers. How far can governments go in banning self-harming
or personally risky conduct without infringing on citizens’ autonomy?
Joel Feinberg’s Harm to Self, explores this question, identifying ten principles that might
justify governmental interventions to limit harms that people do to themselves, to others, or to the
public at large.89 Of these ten principles, several are helpful to this discussion:
• The Harm Principle refers to the concept that it is appropriate for the government to
regulate an actor in order to avoid harms to persons other than the actor.90 Feinberg
identifies this as the principle animating United States’ Food and Drug laws.91 The FDA
regulates medical product manufacturers and distributors to keep them from offering
products that might injure consumers.92 This principle also could encompass, for example,
a regulation that prevents people of childbearing age from editing their own genomes in
order to prevent possible harms to their future offspring.
• The Offense Principle involves regulating an actor in order to keep that person from giving
serious offense to others.93 This could, for example, encompass regulations that prevent
people from editing their own genomes in ways that others might find scary or revolting,
even if the editing poses no health risks to themselves or others.
• Legal Paternalism involves applying governmental coercion to people to prevent the actors
from harming themselves.94 This would encompass regulations aimed at stopping people
from editing their genomes in ways that might be medically risky or harmful to their own
health.
• Legal Moralism approves the use of coercion to stop activities that do not necessarily harm
or offend the actor or other people, but which seem inherently immoral or might cause
broad harms to society or undermine morality in general.95 This is reminiscent of “the
wisdom of repugnance” or “yuk factor,” that Leon Kass advanced as a reason to reject
human cloning.96 It also encompasses a view that I refer to as “wildism,” the conviction
that human gene editing should be avoided because people with pure, natural, wild-type
human genomes are physically or morally superior to those who tamper with their native
genetic purity.97
Feinberg regards the Harm Principle and the Offense Principle as the only justifications for
governmental coercion that are consistent with liberal principles.98 He notes that John Stuart Mill
rejected Legal Paternalism as grounds for state coercion, viewing the goal of preventing self-harm
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as appropriate grounds to reason with people and attempt to persuade them to stop what they are
doing, but not as grounds for compelling them to stop or punishing them if they persist.99
Feinberg spills considerable ink reconciling the fact that many laws do seem paternalistic,
even if the Harm and Offense Principles may, in theory, be the only legitimate grounds for
governmental coercion. “[T]he view that the state has a right to protect people from their own folly
seems to provide the rationale for many [laws] that nobody would wish to repeal.”100 He
distinguishes “presumptively non-blameable” paternalism (exemplified by laws protecting
genuinely vulnerable populations such as the elderly, the decisionally impaired, and children) from
paternalism that is “presumptively blameable”.101 Under this latter category, he includes two
concepts. The first is paternalism that is “benevolent” and well-intentioned in the sense of trying
to protect people, but which overrides the autonomy of informed, competent adults who are neither
vulnerable nor wish to be protected.102 The second is “non-benevolent” paternalism that dresses
itself up as laws to protect people but, in reality, promotes unrelated goals such as industrial
efficiency or liability risk management.
Another important point is that some regulations are grounded in more than one principle,
and the legislative intent is sometimes unclear or unstated. Some laws that seem paternalistic are,
in fact, “mixed paternalistic laws” serving multiple objectives.103 A regulation might be motivated
by “the need to protect the directly restricted party himself; but also to protect third parties from
indirect harm, and even the general public from a kind of diffuse harm.”104 This soup of benevolent
and non-benevolent paternalism is common in modern bioethical analysis. An example is policies
that seek to limit individuals’ access to their own genetic and other health information. There is a
benevolent concern that people may misunderstand their data, worry, or make bad medical
decisions after they receive it..105 Simultaneously, there are non-benevolent concerns that sharing
such data may be burdensome for researchers and waste scarce research and healthcare
resources.106
Feinberg recognizes that law has a useful role to play in ensuring that people’s choices
reflect their true will. He describes “soft paternalism,” in which laws seek to ensure that people’s
decisions are competent, voluntary, and well-informed, but respect their choices once these
conditions are met.107 This approach is common in research regulations such as the Common
Rule108 and the FDA research regulations,109 which allow people to expose themselves to research
risks subject to protections to promote well-informed, autonomous decisions. Once those
protections are in place, however, Feinberg’s anti-paternalistic view respects people’s right to
make their own decisions.110

99

Id.
Id. at 4.
101
Id. at 5.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 16.
104
Id.
105
See NAT’L ACADEMIES SCI., RETURNING INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH RESULTS TO PARTICIPANTS: GUIDANCE FOR A
NEW RESEARCH PARADIGM 61 (Jeffrey R. Botkin et al. eds., Nat’l Academies Sci. 2018) (discussing harms people
may suffer if granted access to test results generated during genomic and other types of research).
106
Id.
107
Id. at 13–14.
108
45 C.F.R. pt. 46, subpt. A (2018).
109
21 C.F.R. pt. 50, 54, 56 (2019).
110
FEINBERG, supra note 89, at 2.
100

15

In reality, law frequently rejects this advice. An early example, dating back to the 1600’s,
is Wright’s case, which is the English case in which an adult man consented to have another person
cut off his hand with the aim of enhancing the man’s earnings as a beggar.111 The accomplice was
later charged with mayhem and cited the man’s consent as a defense, but without success. Such a
consent was invalid, the court reasoned, because it sought to deprive the King of the able-bodied
work capacity of one of his subjects.112 In other words, the court resolved the case under the Harm
Principle (the man had no right to harm the King), instead of on anti-paternalistic grounds.
Wright’s case presents other nuances that are pertinent to regulation of DIYbio. There is a
difference between “single-party” self-harm (doing harm to oneself) and “two-party” cases in
which a person enlists the aid of others.113 A person’s consent to self-harm often exculpates
accomplices to the self-harming scheme, but law treats certain consents, particularly when the
consent is to an outrageous act, as void for public policy reasons. In coming years, courts may
have to set boundaries on which types of gene editing are within the limits of individual consent.
A related question is whether the ostensible right to harm oneself encompasses a right to risk
harming others by involving them in one’s scheme. Those harms to others could include
psychological harms such as feeling guilty or various legal risks if the scheme goes awry and has
unintended consequences. The reason to restrict DIY genomics may not be Legal Paternalism
(preventing harm to the individual) but rather the Harm Principle (keeping the individual from
harming others).
With that background, let us turn back to the question of how FDA should regulate DIYbio
in which the person who produces a medical product will be its only consumer. This would exclude
intra-family consumption, for example, if a parent performs at-home gene editing on a child with
a rare genetic disorder. That latter situation clearly falls under the Harm Principle, and FDA
potentially could require the parent to obtain an investigational new drug (IND) application before
administering the unapproved therapy to the child. While there is some room for debate, FDA
officials have suggested in the past that the agency can require an IND in sponsor-investigator
studies (where the research sponsor is the same as the investigator, in this example, the parent)
even if the study has no commercial motive and there are no plans to submit study results to the
FDA.114 If true, the agency has legal authority to oversee the parent’s experiment, but would face
all the practical barriers the previous section described. In particular, how would the FDA know
the research is happening? This seemingly is a matter for state children’s protective services
agencies. State legislatures may soon need to update mandatory reporting statutes to require
physicians, teachers, and daycare providers to report suspicions about inappropriate DIYbio
research involving minors.
When an adult of sound mind is both the producer and the only consumer of a DIYbio
product, FDA involvement seems legally inappropriate. Feinberg is technically correct that the
FDA’s medical product regulations implement the Harm Principle and are not grounded in Legal
Paternalism.115 Placing the FDA into a new role of protecting people from themselves would mark
a fundamental departure from Congress’s scheme of medical product regulation. This is not to
deny, however, that FDA’s policies can seem paternalistic in fact, even when those policies are
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nominally grounded in other principles. This is the agency that fought long court battles to prevent
dying cancer patients from risking their health by taking Laetrile116 or by trying experimental
therapies that had not yet completed all three phases of clinical trials.117 Moreover, the notion that
the FDA regulates producers, not consumers, runs up against cases like Kessler v. Benten, in which
a woman purchased mifepristone (a drug that blocks the female hormone progestin) overseas for
her own personal use, only to have it confiscated when she returned to the United States.118 Despite
that case, however, the agency often takes a non-paternalistic stance on imports for personal use,
allowing consumers to import unapproved pork and beef insulin for their own consumption even
though these products carry potentially serious risks, including the risk of transmitting mad-cow
disease.119 Perhaps the Benten case is an outlier that rests on the Harm Principle rather than Legal
Paternalism: the consumer stated she intended to use the mifepristone to induce an abortion, raising
concerns about harm to the fetus. The drug has various other medical uses and perhaps could have
been imported had she cited one of those.
There is probably only a small number of DIYbio producer/consumers who desire to edit
their own genomes and have the skills and determination to do it. It is inappropriate for the FDA
to interfere with their activities. Regulation is, however, appropriate if such people offer their
products to other consumers. This leaves the agency ample room to regulate individuals who
manufacture biotechnology products for use by other people, while preserving a crucial space for
citizen science and innovation within the narrow producer-as-consumer business model. DIYbio
practitioners who publish their gene-editing instructions seemingly enjoy First Amendment
protection unless this literature is prepared and/or distributed in a manner that causes it to become
part of labeling for a gene-editing product that they or someone else is marketing.120 For reasons
discussed earlier, software service providers and contract laboratories with which DIYbio
practitioners do business may, in many instances, fall outside FDA jurisdiction. Some may regard
these limits on the agency’s jurisdiction as a matter of deep concern; others may view them as
providing an important frontier for scientific and business-model innovation.
Conclusion
Viewed through the lens of Professor Ikemoto’s “frontier” narrative, DIYbio offers a space
of hope for rare-disease sufferers whose maladies affect too small a population to induce public
funders and commercial biotechnology companies to invest in developing effective treatments. It
is a space for pursuing enhancement, in a research ethical and funding environment that
necessarily, but drearily, prioritizes the treatment of serious diseases over finding ways to make
healthy people happier. DIYbio offers a frontier of science in service of what people actually want,
instead of what ethicists, funding agencies, and commercial product developers think they ought
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to have; supplied at prices they frequently cannot afford. Above all, it is a space for pursuing
science as an expressive activity and provides an important space for business model innovation.
There are regulatory gaps in the current Coordinated Framework, leaving aspects of DIYbio
unregulated or ineffectively regulated. Before crafting governmental or non-governmental
mechanisms to fill those gaps, there first needs to be a careful dialogue about the goals of regulation
and appropriate principles to guide future regulatory efforts.
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